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Abstract: Recent attempts at cooperating on climate change mitigation highlight the
limited efficacy of large-scale agreements, when commitment to mitigation is costly and
initially rare. Bottom-up approaches using region-specific mitigation agreements promise
greater success, at the cost of slowing global adoption. Here, we show that a well-timed switch
from regional to global negotiations dramatically accelerates climate mitigation compared
to using only local, only global, or both agreement types simultaneously. This highlights
the scale-specific roles of mitigation incentives: local incentives capitalize on regional dif-
ferences (e.g., where recent disasters incentivize mitigation) by committing early-adopting
regions, after which global agreements draw in late-adopting regions. We conclude that
global agreements are key to overcoming the expenses of mitigation and economic rivalry
among regions but should be attempted once regional agreements are common. Gradually
up-scaling efforts could likewise accelerate mitigation at smaller scales, for instance when
costly ecosystem restoration initially faces limited public and legislative support.
Existing attempts to realize international cooperation on halting climate change highlight
that many ecosystem services are public goods that can incentivize beneficiaries to free-ride
on others’ mitigation efforts [1]. The limited capacity of the atmosphere to absorb green-
house gases before emissions severely affect climate globally is one public good that can be
preserved though investments to reduce emissions (‘mitigation’ hereafter) [2, 3]. Adopting
alternative investment opportunities with faster payoffs however can delay cooperation unless
it is reinforced by social norms [4] or short-term climate forecasts become severe [5]. Players
can also delay mitigation to wait for others to develop mitigation technology and infras-
tructure, or to wait for rival players to invest first and give up their competitive advantage
[6]. At the same time, achieving climate change mitigation globally and rapidly is critical
to minimizing adaptation costs, and in preventing irreversible ecosystem degradation (e.g.,
species loss, [7, 8]), degradation of human well-being, especially in developing countries that
have lower capacity for climate adaptation [9, 10], and preempting the collapse of favorable
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climate regimes when human impacts exceed environmental tipping points [11, 12].
Advancing mitigation commitments requires incentives such as trade agreements or laws
[13] (‘agreements’ hereafter) that are specific to the spatial scales of political bodies. The
failure of global climate agreements to be effective has led to a focus on building blocks
approaches to global cooperation, in which an agreement grows from local setups [1, 14, 15].
Game-theoretic work predicts that such localized mitigation agreements might succeed where
global cooperation fails by reducing the number of interacting players and the potential for
free-riding [16, 17, 18, 19]. However, the greater potential for bottom-up approaches to
achieve mitigation locally can trade off with a much longer time to achieving mitigation
globally, as change happens more slowly in more distributed systems [20]. So, can societies
enhance both the probability and pace of desired outcomes, such as reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, by a properly-timed switch from local- to large-scale mitigation agreements?
To answer this question, we consider a system of L regional groups, representing coalitions
of countries with shared interests or geography (e.g., BRICS, AILAC, Western Climate
Initiative), formal unions (e.g., EU), or countries with partly-independent states (e.g., United
States). Given that many benefits of climate mitigation require global cooperation and
currently are politically debated, we focus on the impact of the (high) costs of mitigation.
In each region, players can free-ride by not acting on the provision of the public good, or
they can contribute to providing the public good by mitigating emissions. Simultaneously,
mitigators support agreements that, when sufficiently endorsed, punish free-riding through
fines, sanctions, or other penalties. Such sanctioning agreements can be local, affecting
players only within a specific region, global, supported by and affecting all players across
regions, or both [21]. We examine whether bottom-up regional (local) agreements, world-
wide (global) agreements, or a dynamic combination of these two best promotes fast climate
change mitigation.
System dynamics. As observed in other research [19, 22] and in reality [23], we find
that premature global-scale efforts to achieve cooperation on climate invariably fail (Fig.
1a). Although exogenous events occasionally produce brief mitigation efforts within indi-
vidual regions, at a global scale, mitigation never reaches the quorum required to institute
sanctioning agreements (Fig. 1b.iii). In contrast, local sanctioning agreements can capitalize
on stochastically induced, regional mitigator dominance to establish mitigation as the norm
within individual regions. Eventually, this process occurs in every local group, translating
to global climate mitigation (Fig. 1b.ii).
Once local agreements produce a sufficiently high global proportion of mitigators, how-
ever, a shift to global agreements more than doubles the rate of mitigation spread (Fig.
1b, 2a). This difference arises because enacting global sanctions once mitigation is common
pushes non-mitigating regions to cooperate on reducing emissions. Compared with local
agreements only, switching to global agreements doubles the amount of accumulated miti-
gation achieved by year 60 (Fig. 1a) and halves the time it takes for 80% of countries to
commit to mitigation (Fig. 2a). This benefit of switching to global agreements increases
with mitigation cost, sanctioning cost, and the role of payoffs in strategy choice (see Sup-
plementary Figure 1 for sensitivity analysis) because players quickly reconsider mitigation
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commitments that arise through chance events. High mitigator costs therefore decrease the
overall probability that chance events induce mitigation without the benefit of among-region
sanctions that occurs through global agreements once many regions commit to mitigation.
Notably, the threshold required for a switch to be effective does not need to exceed a 50%
majority of regions (Fig. 1a).
Bootstrapping cooperation through local agreements may face difficulties. Investments
in a shared technology, infrastructure, or public support create impediments to early motiva-
tions. Typically, these investments are initially more costly and only as they are implemented
they become progressively more accessible, as more nearby players become mitigators. This
occurs through research and development of industries of trading partners and industri-
ally related products [24], and economies of scale (we refer to these effects collectively as
economies of scale). When there are substantial gains for scaling, even though initial costs
are high, we observe that such economies of scale further increase the benefits of switching
to global agreements (19%, Fig. 2b) as inter-group interactions pull along non-mitigating
regions where mitigation costs remain high, making regional action even more important.
A second major obstacle in climate change cooperation arises at the global scale from
game-of-chicken dynamics among economically competing regions, for which investment in
mitigation can reduce the competitiveness of regional economies through opportunity costs
(Falkner et al. 2010). For instance, China maintains that industrialized countries should
invest in mitigation first so that other countries can catch up economically, while industrial-
ized countries such as the United States wish to retain a competitive advantage. Accounting
for such inter-region rivalry, we find that group rivalry disproportionally slows down miti-
gation through locally based agreements. As local agreements provide no incentive for pairs
of intensely competing regions to commit to mitigation, a switch to global institutions is
more critical in pulling along holdout regions (Fig. 2c). Unlike economies of scale operating
within regions, the positive feedback by which group rivalry holds back mitigation arises at
the global scale. This distinction is highlighted by the fact that, with local agreements only,
some regions experiencing strong competition never adopt mitigation. This highlights that
global agreements can play a key role in promoting not only the pace but also chance of
global climate cooperation.
Importance of switching agreement scales. Given that both local and global agree-
ments are critical to promoting mitigation, does a concerted strategy attempting agreements
at both scales simultaneously improve outcomes or does it risk diluting limited resources?
Attempts to form sanctioning agreements can involve constitutive costs – resources spent
even if agreements fail to establish, such as lobbying for a carbon tax bill that ultimately fails.
Likewise when enacting timely and effective laws is not possible, sanctioning might initially
depend on a few audacious players that refuse cooperation with non-mitigators at substan-
tial cost to themselves, even if sanctions ultimately fail to promote mitigation. For instance,
trade sanctions by Western European nations against all nations lacking aggressive climate
mitigation commitments might disproportionally weaken Western European economies when
global mitigation commitment is rare.
We find that under high constitutive sanctioning costs mitigators must first focus all
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efforts locally, for instance refusing trade only with non-mitigators who are in their group
(Fig. 3). Thereafter, we find that the switch from local to global mitigation incentives is
best done earlier (i.e., lower switching threshold T ) when agreements are easier to establish
(i.e., require less support or smaller quorums to effectively sanction defectors) or global
agreements have greater efficacy (Supplementary Figure 1), but premature shifts to global
agreements can delay mitigation at low levels for extended periods (Fig. 1b.iii). For low
constitutive sanctioning costs, efforts to establish local and global sanctioning agreements
simultaneously do little to affect outcomes (Fig. 3) because global agreements initially fail
and local agreements eventually become redundant. However, a more graduated shift where
local and global agreement attempts overlap might be more beneficial when early global
dialogue establishes a framework for later negotiations, when sanctions are more effective
among neighbors than among regions, or when uncertainties exist in players’ commitments
to mitigation or in the quorum needed to establish a global agreement.
Agreements have scale-specific roles. We find that a timely shift from local to global
agreements consistently accelerates and establishes global climate mitigation over agreements
focused on a single scale. Building on analyses of cooperation dynamics near steady-state
[19], our focus on transient dynamics highlights that global agreements play a key role
in pulling along late-adopting regions once mitigation is sufficiently common. This role
increases as economies of scale, among-group rivalry, or high costs (Supplementary Figure
1) make mitigation less likely to arise through chance events such as popular movements
or natural disasters. Global agreements investigated here can also complement a regime
complex approach to mitigation, wherein groups can form over different mitigation targets
and address different issues that collectively tackle climate change [25, 26]. Overlap in
group membership can accelerate mitigation globally by emphasizing the marginal gains to
cooperation when information about the outcomes of action is missing [21]. Therefore the
current reality that players commit to multiple mitigation targets and political coalitions,
some of which enjoy a high membership, could further incentivize mitigation and reduce the
extent of sanctioning that falls upon local and global agreements.
Our multi-scale model also underscores the importance of local agreements in establish-
ing mitigation during the early phases of conservation efforts. First, local agreements can
capitalize on increases in mitigation that arise from local variation but have little impact
on mitigation at the global scale, as seen in lower benefits of switching as stochasticity be-
comes more prevalent in strategy choice (see SM for description of the mitigation behavior
for varying group sizes, rate of exogenous events and impact of payoff). This aspect can be
especially critical as climate disasters create strong but region-specific momenta for climate
mitigation [27, 28]. For instance, whilst recent wildfires in Australia reinforce climate change
concerns globally, they could create an especially strong case for changing the domestic poli-
cies in Australia towards mitigation. Second, local agreements ‘lock-in’ mitigation as the
norm in early-adopting regions during early adoption phases when global agreements fail.
For this reason, local agreements help mitigation establish and spread when rare whereas
global agreements fail [19].
Implications for ecosystem restoration. While we focus on mitigating climate
change on the international stage, the benefit of leveraging the scale-specific roles of agree-
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ments found here can also accelerate environmental mitigation at smaller scales. In addition
to climate negotiations, mitigating the impacts of climate disasters and reducing greenhouse
gas emissions will increasingly require restoring ecosystems over large spatial scales [29]. The
urgency of ecosystem-level mitigation rises further as concentrated human impacts can be
slow to change [30] and ongoing ecological feedbacks are accelerating ecosystem degradation
[31]. As with climate change mitigation, ecosystem restoration can be costly when local
economies must limit resource extraction or reorient towards recreation. Initial public sup-
port can therefore be limited to a few local communities where traditional values, public
outreach, or successful restoration projects establish conservation as a self-sustaining social
norm [32, 33].
Building on this, our results suggest that environmental agencies first focus limited re-
sources locally rather than in many places at once, prioritizing communities where restoration
has lower costs or greater public support. Establishing ‘buy-in’ among local communities
can in turn accelerate and sustain ecosystem restoration [34, 35, 36]. Ecological feedback
loops can further increase importance of focusing efforts by creating threshold effects, revers-
ing meager restoration efforts while increasing resilience of restored locations to disturbance
[37]. After a string of local successes garners greater public support, a focus shift towards
enacting state-level legislation and concerted restoration efforts in all remaining locations
could ultimately boost the resources, public support, and efficiency of restoration projects
[38, 29]. While most successful conservation movements begin with activism and culminate
in legislation, our results underscore the importance of focusing efforts on one scale at a time
and carefully considering when to shift from local to regional restoration and public outreach.
Continually worsening climate will eventually force countries to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, with current debates centering on the urgency and best course of action to achieve
global mitigation. We have shown one strategy that can greatly accelerate cooperation to
mitigate climate change in the near future by leveraging local and global efforts.
Methods
We consider L regions. Each region, j, contains N players, of which Mj pay a substantial
cost c to reduce emissions while all others do not mitigate, for a mitigator proportion mj =
MjN
−1. When mitigators reach a majority, consensus establishes agreements that sanction
non-mitigators through fines or economic sanctions by an amount pNM . Mitigators also
incur a substantial cost of sanctioning (pM < pNM), for instance when sanctions prohibit
lucrative trade opportunities, a fraction f of which is incurred even if non-mitigators are not
sanctioned when sanctioning coalitions, institutions, or bills fail to establish.
We consider a combination of local and global efforts where mitigators initially form only
local agreements until mitigation proportion mG exceeds a threshold TL, and then shift their
efforts towards global agreements once global mitigation proportion mG exceeds a threshold
TG ≤ TL (when these are the same we write T ). We consider four types of agreements: i)
coordinated flip from local to global agreements, 0 < T < 1; ii) purely local agreements,
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T = 1; iii) purely global agreements, T = 0; and iv) temporary coexistence of local and
global agreements, 0 < TG < TL < 1. Global agreements might additionally differ in
sanctioning efficacy by a factor E. At each time step, one randomly chosen player decides to
reconsider their climate strategy with probability κ, the social learning rate. Players tend to
choose strategies with greater payoffs to a degree β, which reflects the importance of financial
considerations in climate policy. With probability µ, however, chance events supersede any
payoff differences and players choose strategies at random.
Throughout, we use a decreasing sigmoid function Θ(x) = (1 + exp(hx))−1 to model
smooth transitions from local to global agreements (h = 20, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1). We also allow
the point at which local agreements are phased out to occur well after global agreement
attempts begin, with local and global agreement attempts (and, potentially, sanctioning of
non-mitigators) happening one at a time for b = 0 and overlapping throughout the mitigation
process for T = 0 and b > 1. Thus, the amount of punishment attempted by mitigators is
δ(mj) = Θ(mG − T − b) + Θ(T −mG) and reflects a switch from local to global agreement
attempts as mG exceeds T . The amount of punishment realized by successfully established
agreements is then
∆(mj) = Θ(mG − T − b)Θ(pT −mj) + Θ(T −mG)Θ(pT −mG)E. (1)
The total payoffs for strategy s can depend on global (mG = (LN)
−1∑
jMj) and local
(mj = MjN
−1) mitigation frequency:
ΠNM(mj) = −pNM∆(mj) (2)
ΠM(mj) = −c− pM(fδ(mj) + (1− f)∆(mj)). (3)
At each model iteration, a randomly chosen player in group j with strategy s switches to
strategy k (with nk,j denoting the number of players with strategy k) with probability
Pr
s→k,j
=κ
(
(1− µ)nk,jN−1
1 + exp(β(Πs(mj)− Πk(mj))) + µ
)
. (4)
To model economies of scale, we set initial mitigation costs c0 that decline by a fraction
rL past mj = rT using the updated mitigation cost c(mj) = c0(1 − rLΘ(rT − mj)), where
c0 = c(rT + (1− rT )(1− rL))−1 ensures that
∫ 1
mj=0
c(mj) = c in our base model.
To account for the effects of among-region economic competition, we model reduced pay-
offs for regions where players commit to climate mitigation in leu of alternative investments
to bolster their economies. Among-group interactions in the matrix A are 0 for ai=j while
ai 6=j terms are drawn from a multivariate uniform distribution with rivalry reciprocity R =
cor(ai,j, aj,i) > 0. Given group-level payoffs as P (~m) = (~mΠM(~m)+(1−~m)ΠNM(~m))(A+IL),
we normalize the rows of A by their sum to obtain AN and arrive at the fitness of group j
with n mitigators λj,n = P ( ~m′) · (AN − IL)j, where ~m′i=j = n and ~mi otherwise. We then
incorporate the consequences of individual choice for group-level payoffs using the updated
payoffs ΠGs (mj) = Πs(mj)+αGs/2, where GNM = λj,mj−N−1−λj,mj , GM = λj,mj+N−1−λj,mj ,
6
and α scales individual payoff of group competitiveness relative to punishment and mitigation
costs. With this formulation mitigation adoption slows when intense competition happens
among pairs of non-mitigating regions.
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Figure 1: Mitigation is best achieved through a timely switch from local to global agreements,
on account of scale-specific mechanisms. (A) Time series of the proportion of system-wide
climate mitigation over 10 replicate model runs with either global agreements only (red),
local agreements only (gray), or a switch from local to global agreements (blue lines) once
mitigation is sufficiently common (threshold T = 0.5). (B) Region-specific proportions of
mitigators from 0 (red) to 100% (blue) within a single model run under three approaches.
Unlike global agreements (B.iii), local agreements are critical for establishing mitigation
as the norm in early-adopting regions (e.g., region 3 in B.ii); global agreements spread
mitigation across regions once it is sufficiently common (B.i, dashed line denoting switch
to global at T ). Simulations show 8 regions with 18 players in each and no among-region
rivalry or economies of scale; all other parameters values listed in Supplementary Figure 1.
10
Figure 2: Benefit of switching from local to global agreements increases when economies
of scale and group rivalry affect mitigation. Values denote the factor by which switching
outperforms local-only approaches (i.e., 2=200% increase) in mitigation adoption rate (teal)
and the total amount of mitigation achieved by time step 625 (red). Distributions give
relative improvements in rates and total mitigation found within each of 100 replicate model
runs, and vertical dashed lines denote mean improvement in each metric. Note that switching
outperformed local-only strategies in all cases (i.e., all values > 1). Economies of scale
excluded in (a, c), group rivalry excluded in (a, b), and switch from local to global strategies
happens at T = 0.5; all other parameters values listed in Supplementary Figure 1.
Figure 3: Switching agreement scale (black, b = 0) outperforms simultaneous local and global
agreement attempts to promote mitigation (blue, b = 1.5) above low constitutive agreement
costs f . f denotes the fraction of mitigator costs pM incurred at all times, regardless of
whether sanctioning is in effect. Solid lines denote means and dotted lines denote the 25th
and 75th quantiles in mitigation achieved by time step 625 across 30 replicate trials.
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Supplementary Information
Supplementary Figure 1. Drivers of the benefits of switching from local to global agree-
ments over local agreements only. Blue (red) bars denote greater (lower) benefits of switching
with an increase in each parameter from 80% to 120% of its base value. Hashes on each bar
denote the proportion of each change in switching benefit caused by a change in mitiga-
tion adoption rate using local agreements only, and non-hashed areas denote the proportion
of each change in switching benefit caused by a change in mitigation adoption rate after
global agreements begin. We quantify switching benefits as the proportional increase in
total mitigation over the first 625 time steps over 120 replicates.
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